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1 Introduction
Recent studies on poverty and income mobility have acknowledged the wel-
fare costs of the economic risks faced by low-income individuals and house-
holds. Static poverty measures popular in the economics literature cannot
appropriately capture all of the relevant economic circumstances of disad-
vantaged households or individuals. This, among other things, has led to
an interest in identifying those in the income distribution who are not just
poor, but are also likely to become poor in the face of untoward economic
circumstances. This group of households or individuals are those referred to
as vulnerable. In this paper we use a panel regression approach to identify the
vulnerable in light of the di¤erent risks both idiosyncratic and aggregate
risks  faced by UK households using the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS).
A household is typically considered as vulnerable if it is unable to smooth
its consumption in light of idiosyncratic income uctuations. The vulnerable
group of households therefore consists of those who are likely to be down-
wardly mobile in the face of shocks. Identifying this class of the downwardly
mobile in the income distribution is a relatively recent approach that has
largely appeared in the literature associated with developing countries, par-
ticularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the conditions of the poor are
particularly subject to sudden shocks (both economic and climatic shocks).
The concept of the vulnerable as a mobile quantilein an income distri-
bution however is appealing in the context of both developing and developed
countries. Similar to the experience in developing countries, it might also be
expected that in developed countries households close to the poverty line are
particularly sensitive to economy-wide shocks than to idiosyncratic shocks.
Experience from developing countries suggests that government action has
proved successful in alleviating the vulnerable from slipping into poverty, for
instance through credit provision schemes, or employment schemes. Thus,
the starting point for the researcher would be to rst identify what is the
nature of the risks that the households are exposed to. This is what this pa-
per will attempt to do using the British Panel Household Survey using waves
1-12 which span the years 1991 to 2002.
Broadly speaking we can identify three types of risks that impinge on
vulnerable households. First, there are idiosyncratic shocks, which could
be proxied by changes in income and resources of the household. In the
development-economics literature models of risk-sharing focus on consump-
tion smoothing in the face of idiosyncratic risks (Deaton 1997, Townsend
1994). Risk-sharing between households at the village level mitigate the ef-
fect of the idiosyncratic shocks, and only economy-wide shocks prevail as
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being signicantly detrimental to the well-being of the households. This is
tested in a number of papers that also model risks associated with household-
specic characteristics and economy-wide risks (Amin et al. 2003, Ligon
and Schechter 2003). Household level shocks generally involve loss in wage-
employed family members, or simply a large family which strains the scant
resources available to the household. Natural or climatic shocks are a persis-
tent risk to households in poor countries, but lesser so for developed countries.
The other very large risk is that of economy-wide shocks such as ination
which heavily impact the poor and the vulnerable.
Our empirical investigation in this paper will draw upon these simple ideas
of testing for the prominence of the relevant risks to which the vulnerable are
subject. We are not directly concerned with proposing a particular method
for identication of the vulnerable in the UK, or applying a particular method
of doing so; rather the focus of the paper is on identifying the nature of
the particular shocks that render households as vulnerable. It turns out
that, depending on the particular denition of income employed, a variety
of patterns of consumption smoothing present themselves. We examine the
impact of three di¤erent types of risks on consumption idiosyncratic risks,
which are captured by changes in household income, economy-wide shocks
which are captured by the year dummies, and the household specic shocks,
captured by the household characteristics.
The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model of
individual welfare on which the approach to vulnerability is based. Section
3 shows how this can be used as the basis for modelling the concept of vul-
nerability. Section 4 presents the empirical estimations and then concludes.
2 Welfare, income and consumption
We begin with an outline of the underlying model that captures the key is-
sues of economic welfare. Although much of our analysis will be based on the
economics of the household, the approach to welfare is essentially individu-
alistic: it is the well-being of individual persons that matters, whether the
person is living alone or forms part of a larger household unit.
The general model of individual welfare is as follows. Each person has a
multiperiod utility function that depends on his or her consumption stream
(c0; c1; c2; :::):
TX
t=0
tu (ct) (1)
where  is a constant discount factor and u is the instantaneous utility func-
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tion (felicity function) that captures the substitutability of consumption be-
tween periods and also the individuals attitude to risk. As far as risk pref-
erences are concerned we focus on two standard models, namely constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA) where u takes the form
u (ct) =   1

e ct (2)
and, as an alternative, constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
u (ct) =
1
1  c
1 
t (3)
where  and  in (2) and (3) are the indices of absolute risk aversion and of
relative risk aversion respectively.
We need to discuss the relationship between consumption and resources
under an appropriate economic model of household decision-making. This
will be done by rst examining a very special case.
2.1 Perfect foresight
The very special case requires the following assumptions. There is an ef-
cient capital market to which everyone has access; all income variability
can be perfectly foreseen (or there is an e¢ cient insurance market to which
everyone has access); there is no other source of uncertainty. Under these
circumstances the time path of incomes (y0; y1; y2; :::) is not of special interest
to the economic agent: it is only their aggregate, the present value of incomes
over the period, that is relevant. If A is this present value and pt the price
of consumption at time t evaluated at time 0 then this point can be made
using a simple model of intertemporal optimisation.
Maximising (1) subject to
TX
t=0
ptct  A; (4)
implies the following condition
u0 (ct+1)
u0 (ct)
=
pt+1
pt
(5)
where u0 denotes the rst derivative of u. In the case of (2) condition (5)
would become
e[ct ct+1] =
pt+1
pt
(6)
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or equivalently
ct =  t

(7)
where  is the di¤erence operator and
t := log

pt+1
pt

:
In the CRRA case (3) condition (5) would yield
ct+1
ct
 
=
pt+1
pt
(8)
or equivalently
 log (ct) =  t

: (9)
Equation (7) or (9) is a di¤erence equation that will determine the time
path of an individuals consumption under each of the two specications for
u; in each case the initial condition is determined by aggregate resources A
through the budget constraint (4).
2.2 Utility and income
However, the discussion of subsection 2.1 covers no more than a benchmark
case. If we introduce a number of important qualications the analysis be-
comes considerably more interesting.
First, if variability in resources cannot be perfectly anticipated, or if risks
cannot be appropriately insured, then the simple role of aggregate resources
(lifetime income) no longer holds. Instead of completely smoothing the
income stream over the period the optimisation process allows a role for cur-
rent income in the determination of current consumption. Period-to-period
changes in ct will track period-to-period changes in the agents income yt as
in a Keynesian consumption function.
There are important implications for individual welfare, evaluated each
period as history unfolds. Take the situation where the horizon T is e¤ectively
innite. In the benchmark case, because of the strong assumption about
perfect foresight or perfect insurance, welfare would be invariant over time:
the situation would look much the same had one started the clock at time
1 or time 2 rather than time 0. However, under circumstances where there
is less than full insurance shocks to the agents resources will be reected as
short-run perturbations in the agents welfare. These perturbations form the
basis of our concern with vulnerability.
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2.3 Individuals and households
The second important qualication to the benchmark model in subsection
2.1 concerns the role of the household. The benchmark model used only
the term economic agent and could be taken as a simple representation
of the problem facing a person living in isolation. Given that people choose
to live in households we obviously need to consider the relationship between
individual utility and household income rather than individual income; but
more is involved.
For the present discussion a household is simply a grouping of individuals
at any moment. Denote by Nht a typical household h at time t; although
normal human beings value their family relationships this sort of considera-
tion plays no part in our welfare analysis. Individual incomes fund household
consumption: the household provides consumption benets and other eco-
nomic services and will do so in a way which e¤ectively provides local public
goods. Consumption will be determined by resources available to the house-
hold in other words household income. Obviously household income Yht is
determined by the incomes yit of individual members of the household
Yht =
X
i2Nht
yit
However in addition to this simple point it is important to note that the
incomes of individuals may be determined in part by those of other members
of the same household; this will be discussed further in section 3 below.
Let cit denote the consumption of individual i. This will be determined
by the level of consumption Cht in the household to which i belongs at time
t; the way in which this is determined will depend on the scope for economies
of scale and the system of sharing within the household. We make the con-
ventional assumption that there is equal sharing within the household and
that the economies of scale are independent of household resources. Let aht
be the number of equivalent adults in household h at time t; then we have
the following relationship:
cit =
Cht
aht
; i 2 Nht (10)
The deator aht will be determined by the needs of household members as
well as the number of individuals in the household.
3 Vulnerability
Given that risks can neither be fully foreseen nor fully insured against it is
important to consider the ways in which economic agents will respond to
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unforeseen events. Both sides of the domestic balance sheet are likely to be
a¤ected as we consider in subsections 3.1 and 3.2.
3.1 Consumption responses
For the moment let us suppose that household incomes are exogenously de-
termined. If one were to take at face value the model in section 2 then there
is little to say about the agents response: you just have to cut back expen-
diture until it meets income. Under these circumstances income shocks are
transferred directly to expenditure shocks and so on to shocks in individual
welfare.
However, more can be said if the section 2 model is made richer by al-
lowing for a variety of goods rather than a single consumption variable c;
we can focus on household responses involving the separate components of
expenditure. It is reasonable to suppose that in response to an unanticipated
exogenous income fall there will be some substitution amongst di¤erent con-
sumption goods. There is an analogy with the rms short-run response to
market shocks. We may expect similar short-run behaviour of consumption:
expenditure on housing is likely to be less exible than that on some food
items.
The e¤ect of this will be to mitigate the seriousness of the income shock
as it is transmitted to individual welfare.
3.2 Incomes and resources
However, common sense suggests that a further important economic response
to a negative shock will come from the income side of the household accounts.
We may distinguish two components.
Atemporal component The rst is a straightforward compensatory ef-
fect: the economic agent will want to boost income in the current period in
order to o¤set a negative shock. This e¤ect can be seen even if the economic
agent is a single person living alone.
Furthermore we can consider the o¤setting of the point impact of the
shock by members of the household. The entry to unemployment by one
person may induce a switch to paid employment by other family members.
Income pooling arrangements within the household will enhance the damping
of shocks to household resources. To model this e¤ect satisfactorily one needs
to introduce an economic cost to the generation of income. For example, if the
model of section 2 is extended by introducing a two-argument instantaneous
utility function one can model the opportunity cost of time.
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Intertemporal component The second component is equivalent to a kind
of insurance in the form of self-protection. This can be seen even in the case of
a person living in isolation: a negative shock in period tmay cause the person
to revise his view about the likelihood of future shocks and, as a consequence,
make some investment that will make the future negative shock less likely
or reduce its impact on consumption. In a multi-person household there will
also be an important investment response by other household members that
will similarly provide informal insurance.
These economic adjustments by household units can be interpreted as
simple coping mechanisms, an idea that is familiar from the literature on de-
velopment mentioned in the introduction. Each of the economic responses
described in section 3.2 is evidently a form of coping with external shocks
and will change the relationship between income variations and variations in
household consumption and welfare. The extent to which a household is suc-
cessful at coping will clearly depend on the composition of the household, the
resources to which it has access and the attributes of its individual members.
4 Measuring vulnerability
We will use a panel regression approach to identify the e¤ect of any ag-
gregate shocks on the consumption stream of the households. The purpose
of the empirical strategy is to identify the di¤erent kinds of risks to which
the households are exposed, as opposed to proposing a new methodology of
identication of the vulnerable. While there are several alternative methods
that have been used in this literature, the current method (panel regression
approach with various risks acting as regressors) is chosen for a number of
reasons. First, the availability of data. The BHPS is the only panel data set
available which collects household level data, and we are constrained in our
estimations by the availability of specic variables which will enable other
analyses. Second, without imposing any restrictions on how the risks a¤ect
consumption smoothing, apart from that presented in 2, the focus of the
empirical estimation here is to identify any clear indications of the nature of
the risks that the households face.
Suppose householdspreferences are appropriately represented by a CARA
utility function (2) and there are no unforeseen income shocks then, as dis-
cussed in section 2, e¢ cient risk sharing by individuals in each household
would imply the relationship (7). But if there are unforeseen income shocks
yt then an appropriate modication of (7) is
ct = yt   t

(11)
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where the parameter  captures the vulnerability of the economic agent to
income shocks (Amin et al. 2003, Townsend 1994). On the other hand if
preferences are appropriately represented by a CRRA utility function (3)
then e¢ cient risk sharing yields (9) in the absence of unforeseen shocks and
an appropriate modication in the income-shocks case is.
 log (ct) =  ln yt   t

: (12)
Equations (11) and (12) form the basis of our estimation strategy which
is in common with a number of studies using data from developing countries.
The strategy identies changes or uctuations in the income stream as an
idiosyncratic risk, while the aggregate economy wide shocks or individual
(household-specic) shocks are those which impact upon the consumption
stream signicantly. The signicance of the e¤ect of idiosyncratic shocks
to the income stream will thus be revealed in the empirics by a signicant
coe¢ cient of the changes in income variable yit; while the impact of the in-
dividual shocks will show up as signicant coe¢ cients for the household char-
acteristics, Xit. Other aggregate economy-wide shocks are captured with the
year dummies, introduced as wave dummies. Their signicance will indicate
the impact of economy-wide shocks which a¤ected the households irrespec-
tive of the idiosyncratic shocks to the income stream (i.e. idiosyncratic risks)
and household-specic risks. Our estimation strategy thus varies from what
is usually undertaken by studies particularly of developing country experi-
ences (Amin et al. 2003, Dercon and Krishnan 2002) but the parallels are
clear.
4.1 The British Household Panel Survey
The BHPS follows the same representative sample of individuals over a pe-
riod of years from 1991 to 2002. Each annual interview round is called a
wave: there are thus 12 waves of data, providing household and individual
level economic statistics and household characteristics data. The survey
is principally household-based, interviewing every adult member of sampled
households. Each wave consists of over 5,500 households and over 10,000
individuals drawn from 250 areas of Great Britain. The samples of 1,500
households in each of Scotland and Wales were added to the main sample
in 1999, and in 2001 a sample of 2,000 households was added in Northern
Ireland.
The following variables have been used for the analysis:
 Expenditure on food, per week per household.
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 Household income.
 Number of children per household.
 Household size (i.e. number of individuals present in the household).
 Number of household members unemployed.
The data used for the estimation spreads over a span of 12 waves, of
which 11 waves are available with the required data. Waves 1 to 6 and 8
to 12 have been used for the analysis: this is because consumption at the
household level is not available for wave 7. Over the entire spread of the 11
waves, we have a complete panel with 1659 individuals per wave.
Expenditure on food and fuel is available per week per household in the
BHPS.1 To obtain individual monthly data, we estimate monthly expendi-
ture on food and fuel by multiplying the above by 4 (accounting for 4 weeks
per month) and divided by the household size to obtain the per capita indi-
vidual expenditures. In our study, as in many other studies of vulnerability,
income proxies idiosyncratic risk. Monthly income is estimated from annual
estimates (calculated from 1st January to 31st December in each year) that
are available. These are scaled down and deated by household size to obtain
per capita monthly estimates. We also use two more denitions of income:
namely household net income net current income and net annual income
(Bardasi and Jenkins 2004). The three di¤erent denitions of income give us
di¤erent perspectives on the income smoothing process while the monthly
per capita income allows for all the time specic shocks, the net current in-
come takes into account the household income net of the local taxes, while net
annual income does the same over the period of 12 months (net of both taxes
and annual pension contributions). Since we are focusing just on income-risk
here, changes in family composition are not so important to the analysis. For
this reason, therefore, changes in equivalence scale for individual households
are not taken into account for our estimations. We further simplify by as-
suming the simplest form of equivalisation and focusing solely on per-capita
quantities.
Figure 1 presents the basic time proles of the median values of the ex-
penditure and income variables used. While the plot suggests co-trending
between income and expenditure, our estimations later on will reveal that
their rst di¤erences do not necessarily do so. The nature of the income def-
inition involved also proves to be crucial in whether expenditure and income
di¤erences co-trend or not.
1Expenditure on fuel has not been included for the current analysis because of the short
time for which it is available (only last few waves)
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Figure 1: Median expenditure, monthly income per capita and net income
per capita. Waves 1 to 12
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4.2 The cross section unit used in the estimations
The structure of the BHPS appears to pose a problem in not matching house-
holds across the di¤erent waves. However individual persons are followed
through time so that one can track individuals who belong to the same house-
hold over the di¤erent waves. As the household compositions may change
across the waves (due to a household member leaving the household, or due
to the interviewee not being available while survey was being undertaken),
after matching the households and persons across the waves, our preferred
unit of measurement is the individual across the waves rather than the house-
holds. Thus, our unit of consumption (and income) is the person, having ac-
counted for household composition. By tracking per capita consumption and
incomes we are also avoiding the possible problems with having to account
with economies of scale due to a larger household (though, in our case, rst
di¤erencing eliminates this problem as well.
4.3 Estimation and results
We estimate, for each specication of the utility function specication (2)
and (3) three sets of panel regressions.
First we estimate the simplest model based on the CARA specication
(2) using the following:
cit = yit + tWt + "it (13)
where ct := Ct=n;denotes per-capita consumption of the household in wave
t, yit is household income per capita at time t, and Wt is a wave dummy,
which equals one for observations at time t, zero otherwise. The coe¢ cient
t captures the coe¢ cient
1

t in equation (11). We also assume the error
term to be uncorrelated with the RHS variables and to have zero mean. Let
us assume the following dynamic structure:
var ("ht) = 
2
h
cov ("ht; "jt) = 0
cov ("ht; "ht0) = 0
2h = exp
 X
j
jzhj
!
The error term can be expected to vary across households, because of het-
erogeneity in household size, consumption and income. Taking di¤erences
also renders the quantities as stationary. We address the heterogeneity by
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using standard methods of descaling the observations to get rid of the heter-
scedasticity.
We estimate equation (13) by xed and random e¤ects estimation meth-
ods and test over three di¤erent wave lengths:
(a) Waves 1 to 4
(b) Waves 6 to 12.
(c) All 11 waves
We estimate across three di¤erent wave spreads to highlight both short
term and medium term e¤ects of the three di¤erent kinds of shocks. The wave
e¤ects, being economy-wide shocks often manifest themselves more clearly
in the medium term and are not revealed in the shorter wave spans. The
consumption variable we are working with is not available for wave 7, and
has so been excluded from the analysis.
We estimate two sets of regressions. First, we run an empirical application
of the Townsend model (13). We then run a similar specication accounting
for a number of controls which determine the smoothing relationship.
cit = yit + tWt + Xit + "it (14)
where, Xt is the set of controls over individuals, over waves 1 to 12 (ex-
cluding wave 7). This procedure is undertaken to identify the household
characteristics that are driving the dynamic consumption process.
There are a number of ways in which one can estimate the vulnerable
subject to an estimated poverty line. The current empirical literature is
growing with empirical analyses adopting a number of approaches.2 Many of
these are based on the Townsend (1994) model, and interpretations of this
approach have been applied in Amin et al. (2003), Deaton (1997), Jalan and
Ravallion (2001), Morduch (2004). The Townsend model presents itself as
a benchmark case against which other authors depart from depending upon
the assumptions made in their empirical models. In light of our own esti-
mations, a foreword discussing these empirical approaches is sensible. While
Townsends model tests for e¢ cient risk-sharing between households, most
of the empirical studies, for both developing and developed countries, have
revealed that self-insurance has proven to be the more important compared
to inter-household risk sharing. Another nding is that self-insurance in de-
veloping countries is limited and risk-coping strategies are costly (Morduch
2004) . This nding may well apply to a developing country context. Such
ndings are suggestive of a re-modelling of ones estimation strategy.
While the estimations done in this paper are based on the Townsend
model, one can quite comfortably assign an even more straight-forward em-
2See Dercon (2004) for a collection of papers with various methodologies.
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pirical interpretation to our estimates. From the point of view of the Townsend
model, we are here measuring the extent of vulnerability by a risk-sharing
test as proposed by Townsend (1994). This will be measured by the coef-
cient : E¢ cient risk sharing implies that household consumption tracks
only aggregate consumption, but not income. The model tests for full-risk
sharing against there being none by testing for the  coe¢ cient taking val-
ues 1 or 0. Many studies (for example Amin et al. (2003)) who adopt an
empirical model as derived from Townsends model have a di¤erent inter-
pretation of the  coe¢ cient. While the Townsend model only tests for 
taking values 1 or 0, Amin et al. (2003) and Dercon and Krishnan (2002) are
more empirically geared to test for the impact of idiosyncratic and economic
shocks on the consumption stream . Thus while from the Townsend point of
view the interpretation of positive values of the  coe¢ cient is indicative of
risk-sharing, from the Amin et al. (2003), or Dercon and Krishnan (2002)
standpoint, one can assign the signicance of the  coe¢ cient (positive in
sign) as indicative of changes in consumption responding to income shocks
i.e. an idiosyncratic risk. Their empirical formulation typically regresses
changes in consumption on changes in incomes with time dummies account-
ing for the presence of economic or other kinds of shocks which perturb the
natural relationship between changes in consumption and income.
This is the strategy we will pursue in our estimations using the BHPS,
with the intent of identifying the presence of shocks on the consumption
stream. We would primarily like to identify the prominent risks (or shocks)
to which the households are subject. This will be addressed by treating
the  coe¢ cient as one which will measure the response to an idiosyncratic
shock (income shocks). Aggregate economy-wide shocks will be tracked by
the wave dummies in the regression, and household-specic shocks will be
measured by household characteristics as controls. This will act as a precur-
sor and an informative exercise to pursue more detailed analyses of devising
more suitable empirical tools to identify, and track, mobility patterns of the
vulnerable in Britain.
4.4 The estimations
Our rst run is of equation (13) where we estimate the smoothing coe¢ cient
v. A signicant positive coe¢ cient of  would indicate the existence of risk-
sharing within households. Table 1 presents results for waves 1- 4 for the
CARA model using a variety of specications  the coe¢ cient of change
in incomes is not signicant all throughout. We test for this using three
di¤erent denitions of incomes: rst, the monthly income per capita, then
two net income variables: net current income and net annual income. We
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thereafter introduce a number of household characteristics as controls to test
for whether they are driving these results. The variables included are number
of children in household and the number of unemployed in household.
Column 1 presents the regression of the di¤erences in consumption on
di¤erences in income with xed e¤ects. This is repeated in the following
column with random e¤ects, but in neither version is the coe¢ cient on 4yit
signicant. The wave dummies indicate years over which there are signicant
shocks a¤ecting the households(individuals) consumption stream these,
as discussed earlier proxy for the presence of any economy-wide shocks. The
next specication (columns 3 and 4) runs the same with a di¤erent denition
of income that of net current income. Here again the  coe¢ cient is not
signicant, but wave 2 shows up to be highly signicant. The negative sign
suggests that the year corresponding to wave 2 was associated with lower
levels of consumption. The Hausman test (Hausman 1978) for testing the
appropriateness of a xed or random e¤ects specication suggests that t
does not improve on introduction of xed e¤ects. We also run the speci-
cations using the BHPS denition of net annual income the results here
are unchanged for both random and xed e¤ects specications (columns 5
and 6). Note the signicance of the wave 2 persistently showing up in all
specications.
The next four specications (using both denitions of net income) include
controls to check if any of these factors are driving the results  namely,
number of children in the household and number of household members un-
employed. For both sets of income variables, the  coe¢ cient is revealed to
be not signicant (for both xed and random e¤ects specications). Wave 2
and the number of family members not in employment show up as negative
and signicant for the xed e¤ects specication for both net current income
and net annual income (columns 7 and 9). In the random e¤ects specication
of both net income variables (columns 8 and 10), the number of unemployed
variable is no longer signicant, but the wave 2 variable remains negative and
signicant. For the xed e¤ects specication (columns 7 and 8), the number
of children show up as positive and signicant. We thus observe that the
e¤ect of the number of children in the household is not robust to the speci-
cation while not signicant in the xed-e¤ects specication, it is so for the
random-e¤ects case.
It may be of concern that the observed income uctuations yit could
just reect annual variations that a¤ect the household or individual as a
whole, and not household or individual-specic shocks (like loss of income-
earning family member). The economy-wide shocks are controlled in the
regression by our wave dummies. Our  estimates thus detect responses of
household consumption to household-specic shocks controlling for economy-
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wide uctuations. Further, there is substantial household specic (and hence
insurable) risk in these economies.
The following specication tests for the above relationship are based on
the CRRA specication. The empirical model that derives from this model
is as follows:
 ln cit =  ln yit + tWt + Xit + "it (15)
While this specication tests for a di¤erent specication of the utility func-
tion, it empirically also lends itself better to the statistical problems which
medium-to-long run time series data present. First di¤erencing renders the
variables as stationary, thus preventing any spurious co-trending from ac-
counting for a positive and signicant smoothing coe¢ cient.
We run similar specications as for Table 1 in the case of equation (14),
and obtain the results presented in Table 2. It is clear that these conform
more with what our models suggests than in the case of the CARA model.
Column 1 presents the results with a regression of di¤erences in log consump-
tion on di¤erences in log-incomes for the time period of waves 1 to 4, with
xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cient i is now positive and signicant and wave 2
continues to be negative and highly signicant. This result holds for also the
random e¤ects (column 2) specication. However, when the same specica-
tion is run with net (current) income variable, the  coe¢ cient is no longer
positive and signicant, for both random and xed e¤ects specications, in
columns 3 and 4. This result continues to hold when using net annual in-
come (as opposed to net current income), in columns 5 and 6, for both xed
and random e¤ects regressions. Thus there is little evidence of idiosyncratic
shocks in either the CARA or the CRRA specication.
We now introduce the controls, which are tabulated in columns 7 and 8
for both xed and random e¤ects specications. While  coe¢ cient continues
to remain not signicant for net current income, many of the controls which
were hitherto insignicant in the CARA specication are now signicant. In
all specications we nd that the e¤ect of the number of children in house-
hold are negative and signicant (columns 7 -10) with the two di¤erent net
income denitions. However, the number unemployed is only signicant (and
negative) for the net current income denition.
We now introduce the controls, which are tabulated in columns 7 to 10
for both xed and random e¤ects specications with net income. While 
coe¢ cient continues to remain not signicant for net current income; many
of the number of unemployed which was hitherto insignicant in the CARA
model is now signicant. In all specications, we nd that number of chil-
dren in household, and number of unemployed individuals are negative and
signicant.
15
Thus our regressions for the wave set of waves 1 to 4 reveal the following:
 The  coe¢ cient is not positive and signicant for almost all spec-
ications run, except for under the CRRA specication when using
monthly average income (not net income variables). Wave 2 is strongly
signicant and negative in its e¤ect.
 In the CARA specication, many of the household characteristics used
as controls, namely that of number of children and number of unem-
ployed individuals in the household have a negative and signicant
impact on changes in consumption.
 Overall, the CRRA model seems to describe the dynamics better than
the CARA model.
Tables 3 and 4 present the regressions for waves 6-12. Table 3 tabulates
the regressions for the CARA specication, and Table 4 for the CRRA spec-
ication. Interestingly, the  coe¢ cient for the monthly income variable now
shows up to be positive and signicant under both xed and random e¤ects
specications, columns 1 and 2. Waves 8 and 11 also show up as positive
and strongly signicant this result holds across all specications run. The
 coe¢ cient is signicant, but switches signs when using the net (current)
income variable, though wave 8 and 11 is still positive and signicant. Col-
umn 5 and 6 runs the same specications as above using net annual income,
with random and xed e¤ects the  coe¢ cient is not signicant, but the
waves 8 and 11 are strongly signicant again. Columns 7 to 10 introduce the
household characteristics. The results repeat themselves as earlier with the
net current and net annual incomes. Waves 8 and 11 are strongly signicant.
Of the controls, the number of unemployed are strongly signicant and neg-
ative, and number of children is signicant as well, though the signicance
varies across the random and xed e¤ect specications.
We now run the CRRA specications, where the dependent variable is
di¤erences in log consumption and the principal right hand side variable is
di¤erences in log incomes, presented in Table 4. Columns 1 and 2 run the
above specication, using the monthly income (per capita) variable the 
coe¢ cient is positive and signicant. Wave 8 and 11 are again positive and
signicant. Columns 3 - 4 tabulate the same with net current income as the
income variable the  coe¢ cient is now no longer signicant, under both
random and xed e¤ects specications. The same is repeated with net annual
income, where the  is just signicant under both specications. Waves 8
and 11 continue to be positive and signicant.
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Once again we introduce controls for household characteristics. The num-
ber of unemployed in household show up as negative and signicant in regres-
sions with net current income (xed and random, columns 7-8). Number of
children in family show up signicant in some specications, a result that is
not robust for di¤erent denitions of income (columns 7-10). The result that
the e¤ect of the number of children with a signicant positive e¤ect serves
to account for the e¤ect of an income shock signicantly translating into a
consumption shock - the larger household size positively contributes to the
income shocks being passed on to consumption.
The regressions for the waves 6 -12 thus reveal the following.
 Under the CARA specication, the  coe¢ cient is positive and sig-
nicant for monthly income (per capita), but not for other net income
denitions. This result holds under the CRRA specication when using
monthly average income (not net income variables).
 Wave 8 and 11 are positive and strongly signicant under all specica-
tions.
 As with results for waves 1 to 4, the CRRA specications seems to
describe the impact of the household characteristics better than the
CARA model. Number of household members unemployed shows up
as a negative and signicant variable across all specications tested.
The same holds for the number of children, though the signicance of
the results are less pronounced than that of the number of unemployed
household members.
The following tables 5 and 6 present the results for all 12 waves. Table
5 tabulates the regression for the CARA specication, with waves8 to 11
dummies, and with controls for the last four regressions. The  coe¢ cient
for the monthly income variable now again is not signicant under all CARA
specications. Of the wave dummies, wave 2 and wave 8 consistently show
up as negative, and positive respectively, and signicant.
Columns 5 and 6 runs the same specications as above using the net
annual income denition, with both xed and random e¤ects. Here the i
coe¢ cient is again not signicant, though waves 2 and 8 are still negative,
and positive and signicant, respectively. The last four columns introduce
the controls. The general results hold as with the earlier specications 
coe¢ cient is not signicant, and waves 2 and 8 are signicant. For both net
current income specications, and the net annual income specications, we
nd that for the xed e¤ects regression the number of unemployed in the
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household is signicant (and negative), while in the random e¤ects specica-
tion, the number of children in the household are signicant.
Now consider the CRRA specication, where the dependent variable is
di¤erences in log-consumption and the principal right hand side variable is
di¤erences in log-incomes, presented in Table 6. Here, as with the earlier wave
sets we nd that the i coe¢ cient is signicant under some specications.
Columns 1 and 2 run the above specication, with wave dummies using the
monthly income (per capita) variable, for both xed and random e¤ects 
the  coe¢ cient is positive and signicant. Wave 8 is again positive and
signicant. This result repeats itself for specications with all other income
denitions columns 3 and 4 present regressions with net current income
as the income variable, and columns 5 and 6 with net annual household
income  we nd that in all cases, the  coe¢ cient is not signicant. Wave
2 continues to be negative and strongly signicant, while wave 8 is also
positive and signicant. In addition, waves 3, 4 and 5 also show up to be
strongly signicant under most specications. On introducing household
characteristics as controls, we nd that the number of unemployed continues
to be signicantly negative inuence for both net current income, and net
annual income specications (columns 7 -10), while the number of children
in the household shows up as a signicant negative inuence only under the
random e¤ects specications.
nkids number of children per household.
nwage number of household members unemployed.
mnincpc monthly income per capita
hhneti net current income
hhyneti net annual income
lhhneti natural log of net current income
lhhyneti natural log of net annual income
dwaven dummy variable for wave n
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dmnincpc dhhneti dhhyneti dhhneti dhhyneti
F R F R F R F R F R
∆y 0.00086 0.00068 0.00061 0.00090 0.00001 0.00001 0.00061 0.00090 0.00001 0.00001
dwave2 -56.251∗ -56.249∗ -56.238∗ -56.236∗ -56.266∗ -56.265∗ -56.173∗ -56.310∗ -56.201∗ -56.338∗
dwave3 0.196 0.197 0.215 0.222 0.209 0.211 0.252 0.179 0.245 0.166
nkids -0.829 2.073∗ -0.804 2.066∗
nwage -1.531† 0.230 -1.559† 0.225
_const 0.171 0.174 0.169 0.162 0.176 0.173 2.722† -1.660∗ 2.744† -1.637∗
Notes. ∗: Significant at the 1% level
†: Significant at the 5% level
Table 1: CARA model. Waves 1-4
dlmnincpc dlhhneti dlhhyneti dlhhneti dlhhyneti
F R F R F R F R F R
∆log y 0.06438∗ 0.07306∗ -0.00561 -0.00454 0.00449 0.00253 -0.00565 -0.00473 0.00532 0.00292
dwave2 -1.976∗ -1.976 -1.978∗ -1.975∗ -1.975∗ -1.975∗ -1.968∗ -1.974∗ -1.965∗ -1.974∗
dwave3 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.022 0.028 0.023
nkids -0.188∗ -0.027∗ -0.209∗ -0.028∗
nwage -0.121∗ -0.024∗ -0.127 -0.024
_const 0.021† 0.021† 0.025† 0.024† 0.023† 0.023† 0.317∗ 0.074∗ 0.338∗ 0.074∗
Notes. ∗: Significant at the 1% level
†: Significant at the 5% level
Table 2: CRRA model. Waves 1-4
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dmnincpc dhhneti dhhyneti dhhneti dhhyneti
F R F R F R F R F R
∆y 0.00018∗ 0.00020∗ -0.00021∗ -0.00019∗ -0.00000 0.00000 -0.00021∗ -0.00019∗ 0.00000 0.00000‡
dwave8 0.599∗ 0.598∗ 0.640∗ 0.611∗ 0.636∗ 0.607∗ 0.790∗ 0.643∗ 0.785∗ 0.638∗
dwave9 0.000 -0.001 0.044 0.015 0.036 0.008 0.164 0.044 0.155 0.037
dwave10 0.047 0.047 0.088 0.059 0.086 0.057 0.173‡ 0.086 0.170‡ 0.084
dwave11 0.278∗ 0.278∗ 0.321∗ 0.292∗ 0.317∗ 0.288∗ 0.383∗ 0.318∗ 0.378∗ 0.313∗
nkids -0.971∗ -0.064† -0.975∗ -0.065†
nwage -1.123∗ -0.093∗ -1.130∗ -0.092∗
_const 0.097 0.096 0.066 0.091 0.071 0.095 1.990∗ 0.221∗ 2.007∗ 0.226∗
Notes ∗: Significant at the 1% level
†: Significant at the 5% level
‡: Significant at the 10% level
Table 3: CARA model. Waves 6-12
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dlmnincpc dlhhneti dlhhyneti dlhhneti dlhhyneti
F R F R F R F R F R
∆log y 0.01715† 0.02025∗ -0.00484 -0.00453 -0.00612† -0.00623† -0.00471 -0.00448 -0.00593† -0.00616†
dwave8 0.059∗ 0.059∗ 0.060∗ 0.058∗ 0.059∗ 0.058∗ 0.079∗ 0.060∗ 0.077∗ 0.059∗
dwave9 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.015 0.000‡ 0.013 -0.001
dwave10 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.022‡ 0.010 0.017 0.008
dwave11 0.025∗ 0.025∗ 0.026† 0.024† 0.025† 0.023† 0.034∗ 0.025∗ 0.032∗ 0.025†
nkids -0.119∗ -0.001∗ -0.117∗ -0.001
nwage -0.129∗ -0.008∗ -0.130∗ -0.008∗
_const 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.232∗ 0.017∗ 0.235∗ 0.019†
Notes. ∗: Significant at the 1% level
†: Significant at the 5% level
‡: Significant at the 10% level
Table 4: CRRA model. Waves 6-12
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dmnincpc dhhneti dhhyneti dhhneti dhhyneti
F R F R F R F R F R
∆y 0.00008 0.00009 0.00001 0.00002 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00002 0.00000 0.00000
dwave2 -56.755∗ -56.755∗ -56.817∗ -56.757∗ -56.861∗ -56.805∗ -56.644∗ -56.855∗ -56.690∗ -56.902∗
dwave3 0.233 0.233 0.170 0.230 0.173 0.228 0.297 0.118 0.297 0.117
dwave4 0.211 0.211 0.147 0.206 0.150 0.205 0.215 0.082 0.217 0.081
dwave5 0.150 0.149 0.089 0.148 0.092 0.147 0.101 0.023 0.103 0.022
dwave8 0.716† 0.716† 0.656† 0.716† 0.658† 0.713† 0.614† 0.623† 0.615† 0.621†
dwave9 -0.053 -0.053 -0.116 -0.056 -0.112 -0.057 -0.168 -0.118 -0.166 -0.119
dwave10 0.042 0.042 -0.019 0.041 -0.016 0.039 -0.072 0.009 -0.069 0.008
dwave11 0.359 0.359 0.300 0.360 0.302 0.358 0.273 0.373 0.275 0.371∗
nkids -0.086 0.789∗ -0.073 0.789
nwage -1.514∗ -0.048 -1.512∗ -0.050
_const 0.107 0.107 0.160 0.111 0.159 0.113 1.923∗ -0.358‡ 1.911∗ -0.353‡
Notes. ∗: Significant at the 1% level
†: Significant at the 5% level
‡: Significant at the 10% level
Table 5: CARA model. All waves
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dmnincpc dhhneti dhhyneti dhhneti dhhyneti
F R F R F R F R F R
∆log y 0.04014∗ 0.04200∗ -0.00259 -0.00260 -0.00533‡ -0.00564† -0.00245 -0.00254 -0.00521 -0.00554
dwave2 -1.997∗ -1.997∗ -1.999† -1.999∗ -1.998∗ -1.998∗ -1.986∗ -1.997∗ -1.984∗ -1.996∗
dwave3 0.030† 0.030∗ 0.028† 0.028† 0.028† 0.028† 0.040∗ 0.030† 0.040∗ 0.030†
dwave4 0.029† 0.029† 0.026† 0.026† 0.027† 0.026† 0.035∗ 0.027† 0.037∗ 0.028†
dwave5 0.023‡ 0.023† 0.022‡ 0.022‡ 0.022‡ 0.022‡ 0.029† 0.023‡ 0.029† 0.023†
dwave8 0.064∗ 0.063∗ 0.063∗ 0.062∗ 0.064∗ 0.063∗ 0.064∗ 0.063∗ 0.066∗ 0.064∗
dwave9 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.01 -0.01 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008
dwave10 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.00 0.00 0.003 0.000 0.003
dwave11 0.023† 0.023† 0.021‡ 0.021‡ 0.023‡ 0.022‡ 0.02 0.021‡ 0.018 0.022‡
nkids -0.061∗ -0.005 -0.063∗ -0.005
nwage -0.073∗ -0.010∗ -0.075∗ -0.010∗
_const 0.010 0.009 0.013‡ 0.013‡ 0.013‡ 0.014‡ 0.139∗ 0.028∗ 0.142∗ 0.029∗
Notes. ∗: Significant at the 1% level∗
†: Significant at the 5% level
‡: Significant at the 10% level
Table 6: CRRA model. All waves
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Thus our regressions for the wave set waves 212 reveal the following:
 Under the CARA specication, the i coe¢ cient is not signicant for
any of the income denitions. This result changes, as in other wave set
results, under the CRRA specication where one obtains a strongly sig-
nicant relationship using the monthly average income and net annual
income denition specications.
 Wave 2 is strongly signicant and negative under all specications, and
wave 8 is positive and signicant under all specications. Under the
CRRA specication we nd many other wave years (waves 3, 4 and 5)
to be positive and signicant.
 As with the results waves for 1 4, and waves 6 12, the CRRA spec-
ications seems to describe the impact of the household characteristics
better than the CARA model. Number of household members wage
employed shows up as a signicant variable across all specications
tested.
4.5 Summary
We can now summarise our ndings under some broad generalisations:
 Under the CARA specication, the  coe¢ cient is not positive and sig-
nicant for any of the income denitions used, save for a few instances
with the monthly per capita income denition. Instances of its signif-
icance are mostly under the shorter wave-span sets run rst. It could
be indicative of the shorter wave span results as being more relevant
than for the composite 11 wave set. Idiosyncratic shocks, therefore, are
of short term impact, if at all.
 We nd waves 2 (negative), wave 8 and 11 (positive) to be strongly
signicant in the relevant wave-set runs. This holds irrespective of
whether under a CARA or CRRA specication. The e¤ect of economy-
wide shocks is very clear. Under the full wave-set, other waves 3,4 and
5 also show up as positive and signicant.
 Across the results for all wave-sets we nd that the number of unem-
ployed in household to be robustly negatively associated with changes
in consumption. This result varies under the CARA and CRRA speci-
cation for the entire wave span (1-12), but again can be attributed to
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a much larger variation being explained under the larger wave set com-
pared to the smaller wavessets where a smaller amount of variation
is being explained. The number of children in the family have shown
up as signicantly negatively associated with changes in consumption,
though results are more robust under the CRRA specication.
The results that we obtain shed considerable light on the dynamics of
consumption smoothing across British households. Of the three di¤erent
shocks that we test for, idiosyncratic, economy-wide and household-specic,
we nd that in contrast to the developing country experience, the e¤ect of
idiosyncratic shocks is less pronounced than that of the other two shocks.
The coe¢ cient of the changes in income is mostly insignicant across all
our specications, and only so under specications with the CRRA utility
function. What is clearly detrimental to the smoothing capacities of the
households are the economy-wide shocks and the households-specic char-
acteristics. Wave 2 is strongly signicant (and negative) all throughout the
results, as is wave 8, and under CRRA utility specications, waves 3, 4, and
5. Of the di¤erent household characteristics that we test for, the number of
children in the household and the number of wage employed in the household
show up as negative and signicant, and the results are again more robust
under the CRRA utility function specication.
By using two di¤erent utility specications, we have, to some degree,
ensured the robustness of our ndings. While in our theoretical framework
we have approached the consumption smoothing process from the point of
view that the vulnerable individual in the face of a risk will adopt some
coping strategy to smooth their consumption in the following period, due
to the lack of appropriate instruments and a policy variable which acts as a
coping mechanism as one of our right hand side variables, we do not test for
this. This would be the most relevant extension to this work that is to test
for certain policy variables, or coping strategies (like employment other than
in those in the formal sector), or credit schemes made available for vulnerable
households, which testify that consumption smoothing is endogenous in light
of the availability of adequate coping strategies.
5 Conclusion
Recent work on mobility of those with low incomes has focused on the issue
of vulnerability and the well-being of vulnerable households. In this paper we
have sought to give economic meaning to vulnerability in terms of the risks
faced by households. Using a panel regression approach we have shown how
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to model the extent to which both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks impact
on the consumption stream of UK households using the British Household
Panel Survey. The approach is a departure from earlier empirical studies of
identication of the vulnerable in the UK in that it draws upon a theoretical
and empirical framework which enable the researcher to identify the vulner-
able in light of economy-wide aggregate shocks and idiosyncratic shocks that
are likely to render these households as poor. This sheds light on the mo-
bility of both the poor and the would-be-poor in the face of shocks to the
consumption stream.
We nd that depending on the specic denition of incomes used, there
is a variety of patterns of consumption smoothing under the di¤erent kinds
of risks. We have tested for the impact of three di¤erent types of risks
on consumption idiosyncratic risks, captured by uctuations in household
income, economy-wide shocks, a¤ecting all households captured with the
year dummies, and the household-specic shocks, captured by the household-
characteristics. In summary, with the CRRA utility framework, we nd some
evidence of consumption being a¤ected by the idiosyncratic income shocks.
But risks to which households seem to be most exposed to are those of the
household level shocks and economy-wide shocks. Of the household specic
shocks, we nd that the number of unemployed and the number of children
in the family to be signicantly a¤ecting consumption. These results are
robust to utility function specication the particular risk-preference model
and across the di¤erent wave sets. On the other hand, years correspond-
ing to waves 2 and 8 in particular, and under the CRRA denition of the
utility framework, waves 3, 4 and 5 show up as strongly signicant in their
impact. In the case of wave 8, the e¤ect is negative and strongly signicant,
corresponding to year 1992. The ndings are strongly indicative of specic
policy tools that could be made available for the vulnerable. Given that
economy-wide and household-specic shocks show up as most signicant,
there are policies that governments may introduce to arrest the vulnerable
from slipping below the poverty line.
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